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council is apparently lulled into contentment by the recent lowering of steel prices. The proposed Government spending, however, will stimulate the already dynamic force of inflation and higher, not lower, prices are to be expected. This may lead to talk of price controls, but there will probably be much opposition to such a move in Congress. Let us hope that we will not again come to the artificiality of OPA.

Assuming that price controls will not be reimposed and that prices will be allowed to seek their more normal levels, it is then reasonable to expect a higher dollar value of gross national product and higher personal incomes. If this is so, then the next reasonable assumption is that dollar revenue to the Treasury may increase in spite of the recent lowering of tax rates. If prices are allowed to truly find their correct level through the law of supply and demand, it may not be so necessary to raise taxes next year to meet higher budget figures. And, with the hoped-for pruning of dead timber from Government expenditures by a new administration next year, it may even prevent the need for large deficit financing.

## President Truman

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 14, 1948

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, under permission to extend my remarks, I include an editorial on President Truman appearing in the Boston Post, Boston, Mass., of May 12, 1948.

The American people admire and respect persons of courage in all walks of life. This feeling has special application to persons holding public elective office, and particularly the President of the United States.

The editorial is a deserved tribute to President Truman. He is a leader and a man of courage.

The editorial follows:

## CALL IT COURAGE

"Courage," he said, and pointed toward the land. "This mounting wave will roll us shoreward soon."

Thus spake Ulysses, with the valor of a gallant man and the tall optimism of a righteous one.

Come a day in the centuries beyond us, no latter-day Lord Tennyson may ever write such lifting, lofty words about Harry S. Truman.

He hasn't the color of Ulysses. About him there is no clang of swords on shields, nor warriors dashing to the siege of Troy.

His is the mundane lot of being captain of a ship of state, faced not by broadsides of a challenging, wartime foe, but by astute would-be successors in a peacetime election year.

It's not an easy lot. In his position he cannot point the guns and fire. Dignity demands that he stand and do his job—and be the target.

Perhaps he hasn't done it well. Any number of candidates to succeed him will tell you that.

Certain things are unfortunate. He hasn't the Presidential figure of a Harding. He hasn't the political skill of riding seven horses that Franklin Roosevelt had.

He is somewhat the average man—any of us—suddenly catapulted by fate into the White House. That may be the reason why the man in the street still likes him—even though the king-makers have written him off.

What would we do if we were in his place? We have a feeling that, to the best of our lights, we would do the honest, sincere, fair, and just thing—hewing to the line of Americanism and letting the political chips drop where they had a mind to.

And one thing more, in his place—we would like to have what Ulysses and what Harry S. Truman have in common—courage.

No one can ever take that away from him. In an election year, running for another term, Mr. Truman has displayed a high courage in domestic and international affairs.

He challenged Russia in Greece. He defied Russia in Europe. He plumped for equal rights, knowing it would cost him the South. He went through on John L. Lewis, even when the GOP pulled the props from under him.

In the Thermopylae which certain railroad union leaders created, unmindful of possible resentment of labor in the fall balloting, he stood his ground and forced those forcing the Government to retreat.

Any corner politician, tilting back his derby and whispering out of the side of his mouth, will tell you that it was not smart.

No, Mr. Truman has not been smart. Unlike the rest of us, he has made mistakes. Unlike a lot of us, he has not been afraid to admit his blunders.

It does not matter that he has borne greater burdens and faced greater crises than any President in the peacetime history of America.

He has not been clever. He does not duck, dodge, weasel, or beg questions. He generally meets the problems head-on—as a President should—as an American should—with courage.

And come November, that rare and needed quality in public life which he has shown—unmindful of his own personal fortunes—may garner him a lot of votes.

## Foreign Policy—An Inconsistent Crazy Quilt

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. LAWRENCE H. SMITH

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 14, 1948

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Leigh White writes from Tripoli, Lebanon, under date of May 10, that our foreign policy in Palestine is actually undermining the Marshall plan program for western Europe. He points out that the Iraq Petroleum Co. pipe lines to the eastern Mediterranean have been shut down for the first time in its history. Further, that Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the French colonies in north Africa are facing a desperate shortage of petroleum products. It is a fair question, I believe, to ask President Truman and Secretary Marshall just when this crazy-quilt pattern of foreign policy will come to an end so that the people of this country might know what to expect on the international front. I am including Mr. White's ar-

ticle, under leave to extend my remarks, taken from the Washington Star of May 10, 1948:

## UNITED STATES PALESTINE POLICY SEEN AS SABOTAGING MARSHALL PLAN AIMS

(By Leigh White)

TRIPOLI, LEBANON, May 10.—The Marshall plan is being sabotaged as effectively by American policy in Palestine as by Soviet policy anywhere in Europe.

For the first time in its history, both of the Iraq Petroleum Co.'s pipe lines to the eastern Mediterranean have been shut down.

Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the French colonies of north Africa, consequently, are faced with a desperate shortage of gasoline, kerosene, Diesel oil, and other indispensable petroleum products.

## SUPPLIES CUT OFF

All but a small fraction of Iraq Petroleum's daily production of 90,000 barrels is normally distributed to these countries. They now will be dependent on extra shipments of petroleum from the United States and the Persian Gulf.

Every tanker thus diverted—and larger petroleum export production has filled five tankers a week—will mean one less tanker-load of oil for countries benefiting from the Marshall plan.

The pipe line to Haifa was shut down following the closing of the consolidated refinery there after Arab workers had gone on strike in a vain effort to deter Jews from seizing control of the city.

The pipe line to control Tripoli was closed down last week by a strike of Arab workers at K-3 and other pump stations between here and the company's production center at Kirkuk.

## BRITISH MAY BE MOVED

Because of the increased violence of rioting in Iraq, the company is considering the advisability of evacuating its British personnel from Kirkuk for the duration of the war in Palestine. Company airplanes already have begun to evacuate British personnel from pump stations in Iraq and Syria.

Plans for doubling the Tripoli refinery's capacity to 30,000 barrels have been abandoned.

All work on Iraq Petroleum's new pipe line from Kirkuk to Haifa has been indefinitely suspended, and the company's Haifa office has been permanently transferred to Tripoli.

The new pipe line to Haifa, which has been completed as far as the Palestinian border, would have enabled the company to increase its production by next September to 150,000 barrels.

Another battle in the cold war against the United States has thus been won by the Soviet Union.

Closing down of Iraq petroleum has nullified the Arabian American Oil Co.'s successful effort to increase its production in Saudi Arabia this year from 300,000 to 400,000 barrels.

## National Security Council

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. JOHN W. BYRNES

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 14, 1948

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I was deeply interested in the remarks made at another place concerning the Air Force supplemental appropriation bill. Discussing the confusion

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existing within our Military Establishment, it was said:

We must . . . develop a better system for making our large-scale military preparations. Obviously, the Secretary of Defense needs more help. Obviously, the Congress must approach the task with more balance and more understanding.

In fact, it has become painfully clear that no satisfactory method at present exists to resolve the differences between the armed services and to produce an intelligent and integrated plan. . . . The controversy is passed on to Congress and we here are thus required to resolve a technical dispute between professionals. It is utterly preposterous and would be comical if the consequences were not so dangerous.

These few words outline the incongruous position in which Congress has been placed by the controversy raging in the Pentagon. Indicative of the confusion that exists is the fact that the dispute being settled in our Appropriations Committees and during our consideration of money bills. It is a dangerous method of determining our national security policy.

Yet, I believe that there presently exists a satisfactory method of resolving the present dilemma. I called attention to that method during a speech on the floor on May 3, which may be found on page 5339 of the RECORD. In that speech, I called attention to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, and to a method for resolving the military controversy—the intelligent use of the National Security Council.

What is the National Security Council?

It is an advisory body to the President and is composed of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the National Security Sources Board.

What is its function?

It is specifically charged with the duty of assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power and of considering policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies concerned with national security.

Is it equipped to function? Its 1949 budget calls for 1 executive secretary at \$10,000 per annum, 1 assistant secretary at \$9,975, 1 coordinator at \$9,975, 4 staff members at \$39,900, 1 assistant secretary at \$8,180, 1 assistant to the coordinator at \$8,180, 4 assistant staff members, 3 research analysts and 14 clerical assistants.

Is it in operation? It has met 10 times since September, I am told, and it has made recommendations to the President, all of which have been unanimous.

If we were to sit down and attempt to formulate specific legislation creating an executive agency for the purpose of bringing some sense out of our military muddle, we could not do much better than to accept as it is the National Security Council, as provided for in the Unification Act.

Unfortunately, we are unable to make use of the recommendations of the body which, in a trice, could resolve all of the

differences which have arisen in our consideration of defense measures.

Under the act we created this agency as an advisory body to the President and left him with full discretion as to the publicity to be given to its recommendations. This may prove to be a fatal defect insofar as the usefulness of this agency is concerned. Congress, in passing the National Security Act, probably intended that the President, as Commander in Chief, should be provided with the best possible advice concerning the over-all aspects of national security. But I cannot believe it was intended that Congress, which has the responsibility of providing for the common defense, should not have the benefit of the recommendations of this important coordinating agency. For if the precedent of keeping the recommendations of the Council secret is firmly established, then we shall always be faced with the prospect, as is happening today, of attempting to choose between the conflicting requests of the heads of competing military departments. If the recommendations, on the other hand, are made known, then we in Congress will have the advantage of the considered opinion of the highest representatives of all elements in our national security picture, acting as a group in the best interests of all concerned.

The President, of course, has full power to make known the recommendations of this group. I called upon him to do this on May 3. It is the simplest way to bring order out of the mass of confused recommendations with which the services have bombarded us. It would establish a precedent that would go far toward giving more complete meaning to the Unification Act. I am still of the opinion that the President should at once request the Council for a complete report on our national security objectives and requirements in a form suitable for transmission to Congress.

However, I do not think it wise that we wait upon the President for action so vitally necessary. I believe we should open for serious debate the whole question of the future usage of this potentially valuable agency. Accordingly, I am today introducing a bill to accomplish that purpose.

The purpose of the bill, which takes the form of an amendment to the National Security Act, is simply this: To make available to the Congress, if the Congress so desires, the recommendations of the National Security Council, and at the same time to safeguard against the release of any information which must, by its nature, be kept secret. It may be that the measure I am introducing will require perfecting, but I submit it in haste because of the overwhelming necessity of preventing further disintegration within our National Military Establishment.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed, immediately following my remarks, the text of the bill to which I have referred and an article entitled "Behind Armed Service Disunification," by Roscoe Drummond,

which appeared in the May 11 issue of the Christian Science Monitor:

A bill to amend section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947

Be it enacted, etc., That subsection (d) of section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President, as it deems appropriate or as the President may require, and the President shall, as he deems appropriate or as the Congress may request by concurrent resolution, make the substance of such reports and recommendations known to the Congress, but, in reporting to Congress, the President shall not be required to include any information which the Council decides should be withheld for security reasons."

[From the Christian Science Monitor of May 11, 1948]

BEHIND ARMED SERVICE DISQUALIFICATION  
(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—The public is not yet being allowed to know the full failure of the attempted unification of the armed services.

The public is not yet being allowed to know how disunited the Army, Navy, and Air Force have become at a time when the need for unity was never greater.

The public is not yet being allowed to know that beneath the facade of unification there is greater disunity among the armed services today than before the Unification Act was passed.

Obviously, this condition is not going to get corrected until the facts are faced frankly. Since they are not being faced frankly by the military leaders, since they are being concealed as much as possible from public view, it is evident that the facts must be brought out into the open by those who have access to them. Congress and the country will have to resolve the most grievous service disunities as long as the service leaders themselves are proving either unwilling or unable to do so.

Here are the bald facts which for the most part are being covered up by a screen of military double talk and by fancy words from the civilian heads of the Defense Department:

1. Despite words, the armed services have achieved nothing, in fact, remotely approaching a unified concept for an over-all strategic defense plan by which the United States would be able either to defend itself at home or carry an offense to a potential enemy.

2. There is yet no agreement whatsoever on the respective tactical roles which the Air Force, Navy, and Army shall play in the common defense. There is not only no joint operation in sight, no single command in sight, but no agreement on the assigned role which each should play separately.

3. Furthermore, there is no mechanism within the armed services which assuredly can produce a unified strategic plan of defense and assign the respective roles of each service because the unification bill did not provide a unified command to run the "unified" Army, Navy, and Air Force. The present Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot assuredly produce such a unified plan of defense because, just like the Security Council of the United Nations, it can act only when it is unanimous. Thus, the Navy, Army, and Air Force each has a veto over any plan the others might wish to adopt, and stalemate is the result. Stalemate has been the result for more than a year.

4. Today, instead of the Department of Defense presenting a unified military program and a coordinated military budget to Congress, each of the armed services is compet-

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ing for money from Congress by presenting to Congress competitive military programs loaded in its favor. In consequence, congressional laymen are being called upon to judge between the competing services and to attempt to devise something of a coordinated military program because the military leaders of the separate armed services are unable to coordinate it themselves. Thus far, there has been no coordination either in the armed services or in Congress.

Finally, in face of such disunification at the top, the armed services today are riddled with internecine jealousy, knifing, mutual belittlement, and grand-scale noncooperation.

This is not a pleasant sight. But it is worse than that. It is a dangerous state of affairs.

It deserves to be understood that the present disunification of the armed services does not spring from the so-called unification bill. It is simply that the unification bill has not brought unification because the legislation permitted but did not compel unification.

There is a reason for the prevailing jealousy and disunity between the armed services, primarily between the Air Force and the Navy. The reason is that one of the most delicate, difficult, and far-reaching decisions has to be made right at this time. That decision is which of the armed services—in this instance, whether the Air Force or the Navy—shall be the real, agreed, all-powerful striking force in the plan of American defense.

The nature of this decision explains, though it certainly does not justify, the present state of almost total disunity in the armed services. No decision is being made today. The attempt to do so, when Secretary of Defense Forrestal took the generals and admirals and figuratively locked them up together at Key West a few weeks ago, was a fiasco.

The development of a unified American defense plan, the necessary integration of the armed services to carry out a unified defense plan, and an intelligent allocation of funds based upon a unified defense plan are today all going by default.

## Confused Foreign Policy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. WILLIAM J. MILLER

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 14, 1948

Mr. MILLER of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, the following article written by Mr. David Lawrence appeared in the Washington Evening Star of May 13.

I agree wholeheartedly with the thoughts expressed by Mr. Lawrence:

TRUMAN AND MARSHALL BUSY APOLOGIZING FOR  
DECLARATION TO RUSSIA—WORDS ADD TO  
CONFUSION OF AMERICAN PEOPLE ON UNITED  
STATES FOREIGN POLICY

(By David Lawrence)

Having made a declaration that thrilled the world, the White House and the State Department have since spent most of the time apologizing for it and even minimizing its importance.

Originally designed as a statement to clear up confusion that might exist in the minds of Russians concerning American foreign policy, Secretary Marshall and President Truman now have succeeded in bringing confusion to Americans as to what really is American policy.

In the note, which was carefully prepared inside the State Department a week ago and

then read orally by Ambassador Smith at Moscow to Mr. Molotov, there appeared the following sentence:

"As far as the United States is concerned, the door is always wide open for full discussion and the composing of our differences."

Less than 12 hours after that sentence gave the world the first glimmer of hope that the cold war might be settled, President Truman issued a statement reviewing what was in the note and summarizing it as having two salient points, but carefully omitting all reference to the discussion of differences. The omission was a major blunder. It could make millions of votes for Henry Wallace.

## MARSHALL'S STATEMENT

Within a day afterward, the Secretary of State, General Marshall, also issued a carefully prepared statement in which the following words appear:

"General Smith did not ask for any general discussion or negotiation. We have had a long and bitter experience with such efforts. This Government has no intention of entering into bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Government on matters relating to the interests of other governments."

When Secretary Marshall speaks of General Smith he refers to Ambassador Smith, who is on leave from the Army and serving as the head of the American Embassy in Moscow.

Just what does Secretary Marshall mean? The words of the American note certainly indicate a desire for discussion of some kind. Why did Mr. Marshall feel it necessary to apologize or to construe the words of the American note as meaning something entirely different from that which the plain words say?

Maybe Mr. Marshall felt that Britain and France wouldn't like bilateral negotiations on matters affecting them. But the Russian note didn't ask for bilateral negotiations, or anything so formal. It merely welcomed the American note with these words, now given out as the official translation by the State Department:

"The Soviet Government shares the desire, expressed in this statement by the Government of the United States of America, to better these relations and is in agreement with the proposal to proceed with this aim toward a discussion and settlement of the differences between us."

Here is a significant pronouncement and the State Department quibbles about the difference between a proposal and a declaration, or the difference between a negotiation and a discussion. Foreign Secretary Bevin, of Great Britain was far more realistic in his speech to the House of Commons when he said that he didn't understand that a conference was being called. He urged a preparatory exchange of views to get at a precise understanding or else any subsequent conference would be futile.

## REVIVED OLD CUSTOM

All that the Russians really have done is to revive the old custom of direct talks through diplomatic representatives, rather than conference by kilg light. They, too, see no use in a multipower conference at this time. But if Secretary Marshall doesn't want Ambassador Smith even to talk about the world situation because it might affect the interests of other governments, then the chances of making peace are hopeless.

The American people will rapidly lose confidence in General Marshall as the right man to head the State Department if he adopts too rigid a position on what ought to be the most flexible process in the whole machinery of modern government—conversations between ambassadors and foreign secretaries. In the old days it was considered tactful for two governments to talk first and lay the foundation for conferences with other governments. Resourceful diplomacy is ready always to discuss and talk about anything and everything, but this does not necessarily

mean commitment or agreement in the early stages.

The peoples of the world are way ahead of their technical-minded and cautious spokesmen who use phrases that mean something one day and then are disparaged the next day. The big news of the year is contained in the dispatches from Moscow telling of the smiles of satisfaction and sense of relief of the Russian people as they watched the news bulletin boards telling about the latest exchange of notes. This reveals that the Russian people, like the American people, have been worried lest inept governmental leaders should lead them into a needless war. Folks behind the iron curtain apparently are human, too, and have had enough of war.

## Tariff Termites and the Meat Famine

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 14, 1948

\* Mrs. DOUGLAS. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following article and editorial from the Washington Post, Wednesday, April 28, 1948:

"ME AND MINE" TARIFF THREAT

(By Malvina Lindsay)

FOOTING THE BILL

Another drop in the American standard of living, already falling through inflated prices, is threatened by efforts in Congress of high tariff exponents to weaken if not end the reciprocal-trade agreements program, authority for which expires in June.

Opponents of the program are said now to favor a slow death, or a delayed execution for it rather than an outright killing. Thus openly, at least, this country would not the economic cornerstone out from under the whole foreign program, including ERP. It would let the termites of restriction do the job.

Aside from the effect of this on future American trade, employment, prosperity, even on war and peace, is the way it would hit the family dinner table, clothes closet, budget. Economic isolationists when they paid their bills might find their tough policy toward "foreigners'" products had backfired. They probably would find themselves paying a little more for more and more kinds of goods—all because duties were being raised or placed on the innumerable foreign products that enter into daily living.

One of the first results of a weakening of the tariff agreements would be a field day in Washington for the strong lobbies for industries whose products enter materially into the cost of living. The consumer would realize that another trade war was beginning when he found himself paying not only the cost of duties on products he needed but also the higher cost of the "protected" articles produced in the United States.

Clothes prices would soon reflect what was going on. Domestic wool producers, who are most vocal for protection for their relatively small industry, were able to get through the present Congress a bill providing for imposition of wool import quotas. The bill was stopped by a Presidential veto.

Silk prices would no doubt reflect rising tariffs levied in protection of rayon and nylon. Gloves and shoes also would be affected. Hide production in this country is inadequate to meet needs and the customer would have the choice of paying the tariff on